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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 John MacDonald, on behalf of himself and a putative 
class, sued CashCall, Inc., WS Funding, LLC, Delbert Services 
Corp., and J. Paul Reddam (collectively “Defendants”) over a 
loan agreement that he contends is usurious and 
unconscionable.  The agreement includes (1) a provision 
requiring that all disputes be resolved through arbitration 
conducted by a representative of the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe (“CRST”) and (2) a clause that delegates questions about 
the arbitration provision’s enforceability to the arbitrator.  
Defendants moved to compel arbitration, which the District 
Court denied.  Because the parties’ agreement directs 
arbitration to an illusory forum, and the forum selection clause 
is not severable, the entire agreement to arbitrate, including the 
delegation clause, is unenforceable, and we will therefore 
affirm. 
 
I 
 
In 2012, New Jersey resident John MacDonald saw an 
advertisement for loans from Western Sky.  He electronically 
executed a Western Sky Consumer Loan Agreement (the 
“Loan Agreement”) and obtained a $5,000 loan.  He was 
charged a $75 origination fee and a 116.73% annual interest 
rate over the seven-year term of the loan, resulting in a 
$35,994.28 finance charge.     
 
The Loan Agreement stated that it 
 
is subject solely to the exclusive laws and 
jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 
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Cheyenne River Indian Reservation.  By 
executing this Loan Agreement, you, the 
borrower, hereby acknowledge and consent to be 
bound to the terms of this Loan Agreement, 
consent to the sole subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal 
Court, and that no other state or federal law or 
regulation shall apply to this Loan Agreement, 
its enforcement or interpretation. 
 
J.A. 80.  In addition, the Agreement included the following 
choice of law clause: 
 
Governing Law.  This Agreement is governed 
by the Indian Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution of the United States of America and 
the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.  We 
do not have a presence in South Dakota or any 
other states of the United States.  Neither this 
Agreement nor Lender is subject to the laws of 
any state of the United States of America.  By 
executing this Agreement, you hereby expressly 
agree that this Agreement is executed and 
performed solely within the exterior boundaries 
of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation, a 
sovereign Native American Tribal Nation.  You 
also expressly agree that this Agreement shall be 
subject to and construed in accordance only with 
the provisions of the laws of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe, and that no United States state or 
federal law applies to this Agreement.  
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J.A. 85.  The Loan Agreement also included several arbitration 
provisions: 
 
Agreement to Arbitrate.  You agree that any 
Dispute, except as provided below, will be 
resolved by Arbitration, which shall be 
conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal 
Nation by an authorized representative in 
accordance with its consumer dispute rules and 
the terms of this Agreement. 
 
Arbitration Defined.  Arbitration is a means of 
having an independent third party resolve a 
Dispute.  A “Dispute” is any controversy or 
claim between you and Western Sky or the 
holder or servicer of the Note.  The term Dispute 
is to be given its broadest possible meaning and 
includes, without limitation, all claims or 
demands (whether past, present, or future, 
including events that occurred prior to the 
opening of this Account) based on any legal or 
equitable theory (tort, contract, or otherwise), 
and regardless of the type of relief sought (i.e. 
money, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief). 
A Dispute includes . . . any issue concerning the 
validity, enforceability, or scope of this loan or 
the Arbitration agreement . . . . 
 
Choice of Arbitrator.  Any party to a dispute 
. . . may send the other party written notice . . . 
of their intent to arbitrate and setting forth the 
subject of the dispute along with the relief 
requested, even if a lawsuit has been filed.  
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Regardless of who demands arbitration, you 
shall have the right to select any of the following 
arbitration organizations to administer the 
arbitration: the American Arbitration 
Association . . . JAMS [Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Services] . . . or an arbitration 
organization agreed upon by you and the other 
parties to the Dispute.  The arbitration will be 
governed by the chosen arbitration 
organization’s rules and procedures applicable 
to consumer disputes, to the extent that those 
rules and procedures do not contradict either the 
law of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or the 
express terms of this Agreement to 
Arbitrate. . . . 
 
* * * 
 
Applicable Law and Judicial Review.  THIS 
ARBITRATION PROVISION IS MADE 
PURSUANT TO A TRANSACTION 
INVOLVING THE INDIAN COMMERCE 
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND 
SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF 
THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE.  
The arbitrator will apply the laws of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation and the 
terms of this Agreement.  The arbitrator must 
apply the terms of this Arbitration agreement, 
including without limitation the waiver of class-
wide Arbitration.  The arbitrator will make 
written findings and the arbitrator’s award may 
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be filed in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal 
Court, which has jurisdiction in this matter.   
 
* * * 
 
If any of this Arbitration Provision is held 
invalid, the remainder shall remain in effect. 
 
J.A. 86-89 (emphasis in original). 
 
MacDonald subsequently received notice that Western 
Sky Financial sold the loan to WS Funding and that CashCall 
and Delbert would service the loan.  MacDonald submitted 
monthly payments to WS Funding, CashCall, or Delbert, and 
as of April 2016, he had paid Defendants a total of $15,493.00 
on his $5,000 loan.1   
 
MacDonald sued Defendants on behalf of himself and a 
putative class of those similarly situated,2 alleging violations 
of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act and New Jersey usury, consumer finance, 
and consumer fraud laws.  The Complaint asserted that 
Western Sky and Defendants’ have a long history of unlawful 
and deceptive lending practices and that federal circuit courts 
                                                                
1 This amount included $38.50 in principal, $15,256.65 
in interest, and $197.85 in fees.   
2 The class is defined in the Complaint to include “[a]ll 
individuals who, on or after May 17, 2010, made payments to 
one or more Defendants on loans originated by the Western 
Sky Enterprise where the borrower was located in the State of 
New Jersey at the time the loan was originated.”  J.A. 59 
(Compl. ¶ 45). 
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have characterized the arbitration provisions in the loan 
agreements as “a sham and an illusion.”  J.A. 56 (Compl. ¶¶ 
31, 34).  MacDonald requested a declaration voiding the 
arbitration, choice of law, and class waiver clauses, and sought 
restitution.   
 
Defendants moved to compel arbitration and, 
alternatively, to dismiss the Complaint.  The District Court 
declined to compel arbitration because the Loan Agreement’s 
express disavowal of federal and state law rendered the 
arbitration agreement invalid as an unenforceable prospective 
waiver of statutory rights.3  Defendants appeal the District 
Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  
  
II4 
 
“Our review of the District Court’s order denying the 
motion to compel arbitration is plenary.”  Kirleis v. Dickie, 
McCarney & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2009); 
see also Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 
(3d Cir. 2010) (stating that our Court “exercise[s] plenary 
review over questions regarding the validity and enforceability 
of an agreement to arbitrate.”).  “[B]ecause our review is 
plenary, ‘we may affirm on any grounds supported by the 
record.’”  Hassen v. Gov’t of V.I., 861 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 
2017) (quoting Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & 
N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015)).  
                                                                
3 The District Court also dismissed some of 
MacDonald’s claims and allowed some claims to proceed, but 
that ruling is not before us. 
 4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d).  Our Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16.  
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The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et 
seq., reflects the “national policy favoring [arbitration] and 
place[s] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other 
contracts.”  Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 
581 (2008); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating that “[a] written 
provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . arising out 
of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”).  Thus, generally, courts 
“must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to 
their terms, including terms that ‘specify with whom the parties 
choose to arbitrate their disputes,’ and ‘the rules under which 
that arbitration will be conducted.’”  Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (internal 
citations omitted).  Parties can seek judicial enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement under FAA § 4, and courts can appoint 
an arbitrator if one is not specified in the contract, pursuant to 
FAA § 5.  The common-law rules of contract interpretation 
apply to arbitration agreements.  Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995).   
 
III 
 
Defendants assert that the District Court erred in 
refusing to compel arbitration because, among other things, (1) 
MacDonald did not specifically challenge the enforceability of 
the Loan Agreement’s delegation clause, which directs the 
arbitrator to decide the enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement, (2) the District Court erroneously construed the 
arbitration provisions as an impermissible prospective waiver 
of federal statutory rights, (3) the AAA and JAMS arbitral 
forums are available to arbitrate pursuant to the arbitration 
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provisions of the Loan Agreement, and (4) the Loan 
Agreement contains an enforceable severability clause that 
should have been applied to sever any unenforceable 
provisions while allowing arbitration to proceed.   
 
A 
 
The Loan Agreement provides that an arbitrator should 
resolve threshold questions “concerning the validity, 
enforceability, or scope of this loan or the Arbitration 
agreement.”  J.A. 86-87.  This is known as a “delegation 
clause.”  A court cannot reach the question of the arbitration 
agreement’s enforceability unless a party challenged the 
delegation clause and the court concludes that the delegation 
clause is not enforceable.  
 
A party contesting the enforceability of a delegation 
clause must “challenge[] the delegation provision 
specifically.”  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 
63, 70, 72 (2010).  To do so, the party must at least reference 
the provision in its opposition to a motion to compel 
arbitration.  See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72 (finding no 
specific challenge to a delegation clause where, among other 
things, the party’s opposition brief “nowhere . . . even 
mention[ed] the delegation provision.”); Parm v. Nat’l Bank of 
Cal., N.A., 835 F.3d 1331, 1335 n.1 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that a party properly raised its challenge to a 
delegation provision by directly challenging it in its opposition 
to the motion to compel arbitration).   
 
In specifically challenging a delegation clause, a party 
may rely on the same arguments that it employs to contest the 
enforceability of other arbitration agreement provisions.  See 
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Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 74 (suggesting that had a party 
challenged a delegation provision based on the same 
arguments raised with respect to other provisions of the 
arbitration agreement, that would have been sufficient for a 
court to consider the delegation provision challenge).5  
However, contesting the validity of an arbitration agreement as 
a whole, without specifically disputing the delegation clause 
contained therein, is not sufficient to challenge the delegation 
provision.  Id. at 70-75; see also Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 
F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 2015) (reading Rent-A-Center 
to require a specific challenge to a delegation provision; 
challenging the contract as a whole is insufficient).  Without a 
specific challenge to a delegation provision, the court must 
treat that provision as valid and enforce it according to FAA § 
4, 9 U.S.C. § 4.  Parnell, 804 F.3d at 1146-47 (citing Rent-A-
Center, 561 U.S. at 72).  
 
Here, unlike in Rent-A-Center, MacDonald specifically 
challenged the delegation clause.  His Complaint alleges that 
“[b]ecause the arbitration procedure described in the 
agreement is fabricated and illusory, any provision requiring 
                                                                
5 Defendants’ citation to our decision in South Jersey 
Sanitation Co., Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk 
Assurance Co., Inc., 840 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2016) is unavailing.  
According to Defendants, that case held that the content of the 
challenge to the delegation clause must be “exclusive” to that 
clause.  Appellant Br. at 39 (quoting S. Jersey Sanitation Co., 
840 F.3d at 143).  In fact, no delegation provision was at issue 
in that case.  Instead, we had occasion to decide only whether 
the plaintiff had challenged the arbitration provision with 
sufficient specificity, as opposed to challenging the contract as 
a whole.  
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that the enforceability of the arbitration procedure must be 
decided through arbitration is also illusory and unenforceable.”  
J.A. 56 (Compl. ¶ 32).  Similarly, his brief opposing 
Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration states that “the 
delegation clause suffers from the same defect as the 
arbitration provision,” and includes a section discussing this 
challenge.  ECF No. 16 at 15.  These explicit references to the 
delegation clause are sufficient to contest it.  Therefore, the 
District Court did not err in assessing the delegation clause’s 
enforceability.   
 
B 
 
MacDonald asserts that the Loan Agreement’s 
delegation clause and arbitration provisions are unenforceable 
for the same reasons—the arbitration mechanism articulated in 
the Loan Agreement is illusory, and the arbitration provisions 
provide for an impermissible prospective waiver of federal and 
state rights.  We need not address the prospective waiver 
argument because we conclude that the arbitral forum provided 
for in the Loan Agreement is nonexistent.  As a result, and as 
explained herein, there is no arbitration forum in which an 
arbitrator could evaluate whether the arbitration provision is 
enforceable.       
 
1 
 
The Loan Agreement’s arbitration provision states that 
disputes “will be resolved by Arbitration, which shall be 
conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an 
authorized representative in accordance with its consumer 
dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement.”  J.A. 86.  This 
language requires the Tribe’s involvement in the arbitration, 
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but as our sister circuit courts have noted, such a tribal arbitral 
forum does not exist.  See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 
F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that the plaintiff 
debtor presented the court with a letter from the Tribe stating 
that “the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the governing authority, 
does not authorize Arbitration” and that “the Tribe has nothing 
to do with any of this business”); Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 
764 F.3d 765, 776 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that “The Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe ‘does not authorize Arbitration,’ it does not 
involve itself in the hiring of arbitrators, and it does not have 
consumer dispute rules,” and thus concluding that it was an 
“illusory” and “unreasonable” forum).  Indeed, Defendants 
have not contested that CRST arbitration is unavailable.  Thus, 
we conclude, like our sister circuits, that the CRST arbitral 
forum is nonexistent.  
 
2 
 
Defendants nonetheless argue that an arbitral forum is 
available because the Choice of Arbitrator provision permits 
arbitration before AAA or JAMS without relying on a CRST 
representative or CRST consumer dispute rules.  To evaluate 
this argument, we must interpret the Choice of Arbitrator 
clause. 
 
  As a threshold matter, we must determine what 
substantive law governs our interpretation.  The District Court 
concluded that, notwithstanding the parties’ choice of CRST 
law, New Jersey law applies to this dispute.  We agree.  Here, 
the Loan Agreement repeatedly references CRST law, but the 
parties have not provided the Court with any such law.  Cf. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.  Therefore, we will apply the forum’s 
contract interpretation principles.  See Parm, 835 F.3d at 1335 
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(“[B]ecause the parties have not provided us with a clear 
statement of CRST contract interpretation, we apply [the forum 
state’s] plain-meaning rule to interpret the loan agreement.”); 
Parnell, 804 F.3d at 1147 (applying the forum state’s law to 
interpret the loan agreement because “the parties provided this 
court with no rule of tribal law regarding contract interpretation 
and our research uncovered none”); Jackson, 764 F.3d at 777 
(stating that if an arbitration agreement’s choice of law 
provision is invalid, then the forum’s state law “would govern 
the question of the validity of the choice of forum provision”); 
see also Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62-64 (applying “common-
law” and “cardinal” principles of contract interpretation from 
the forum state, the state selected in the agreement’s choice-of-
law provision, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to 
construe the terms of an arbitration agreement); Gay v. 
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 387-89 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying 
Pennsylvania law to interpret an arbitration agreement because 
“[i]n applying ordinary state law principles to evaluate 
arbitration agreements, . . . courts may look . . . to the laws of 
the involved state or territory” and “if the District Court’s 
jurisdiction in this federal question case had been based on 
diversity of citizenship of the parties we would apply 
Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law principles as the court was in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania”).6 
                                                                
6 In addition, New Jersey courts will enforce a choice-
of-law provision unless it violates public policy.  Instructional 
Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 133 
(N.J. 1992).  For the reasons stated by the District Court, the 
agreement’s choice of CRST law violated public policy as 
defined by New Jersey law, and thus, the Court was correct to 
determine that New Jersey substantive law applies. 
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Under New Jersey law, “courts should enforce contracts 
as the parties intended,” Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 77 
(N.J. 2007), which is assessed by examining the “plain 
language of the contract,” “the surrounding circumstances, and 
the purpose of the contract,” Highland Lakes Country Club & 
Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 892 A.2d 646, 656 (N.J. 2006).  In 
addition, “[c]ontract provisions are to be interpreted so as to 
give each provision meaning, rather than rendering some 
provisions superfluous.”  Carter v. Exxon Co. USA, 177 F.3d 
197, 206 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Ehrnes v. Hronix, 23 
A.2d 592, 593 (N.J. 1942)); see also Matter of Cmty. Med. Ctr., 
623 F.2d 864, 866 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that under New 
Jersey law, “all parts of the writing will be given effect if 
possible”).  Arbitration agreements should be read “liberally in 
favor of arbitration,” but courts “may not rewrite a contract to 
broaden the scope of arbitration.”  Garfinkel v. Morristown 
Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 773 A.2d 665, 670 
(N.J. 2001) (quoting multiple sources).  This is because a 
“court will not make a different or better contract than the 
parties themselves have seen fit to enter into.”  Matter of Cmty. 
Med. Ctr., 623 F.2d at 866.  
 
The Choice of Arbitrator provision allows the parties to 
select the AAA, JAMS, or some other agreed upon 
organization “to administer the arbitration . . . [under] the 
chosen arbitration organization’s rules and procedures . . . to 
the extent that those rules and procedures do not contradict 
either the law of the [CRST] or the express terms of [the Loan] 
Agreement. . . .”  J.A. 87.  The role of an arbitration 
administrator is to “manage the administrative aspects of the 
arbitration, such as the appointment of the arbitrator,” but the 
administrator “does not decide the merits of a case.”  AAA 
Consumer Arbitration Rules at 6, 39 (available at 
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https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pd
f); see also JAMS: Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & 
Procedures, R. 2(a) & (b), 15 (allowing parties to direct 
appointment of an arbitrator or utilize JAMS procedures for 
selecting an arbitrator); Parm, 835 F.3d at 1336 n.3.  Thus, the 
plain language of the Choice of Arbitrator provision belies 
Defendants’ argument that it provides an available arbitral 
forum. 
 
Moreover, construing the Choice of Arbitrator 
provision to mean that it does not provide an alternative arbitral 
forum to resolve the dispute is consistent with the Loan 
Agreement’s forum selection clause, which states that the 
arbitration “shall be conducted by the [CRST] by an authorized 
representative,” J.A. 86.  Construing the Choice of Arbitrator 
provision to give parties the right to have AAA or JAMS only 
to administer the arbitration, subject to the Loan Agreement’s 
requirement that a CRST representative conduct the 
arbitration, gives both clauses effect.  To construe the Choice 
of Arbitrator provision to allow arbitration by someone other 
than a CRST representative would be irreconcilable with the 
forum selection clause’s requirement that a CRST 
representative conduct the arbitration.  For this additional 
reason, the Choice of Arbitrator provision does not provide a 
basis for concluding that an alternative arbitral forum is 
available.  Parm, 835 F.3d at 1335; J.A. 87 (concluding that the 
Choice of Arbitrator Clause permits AAA or JAMS to 
administer the arbitration according to those organizations’ 
rules only “to the extent that those rules and procedures do not 
contradict either the law of [CRST] or the express terms of this 
[Loan] Agreement”).  
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Defendants’ argument that the Loan Agreement’s 
arbitration provisions do not require a CRST representative’s 
involvement also fails.  Defendants assert that the provision 
states that “any Dispute, except as provided below, will be 
resolved by Arbitration, which shall be conducted by the 
[CRST] by an authorized representative,” and that the phrase 
“except as provided below” refers to the next paragraph, which 
discusses arbitration using AAA and JAMS.  Reply Br. 15-16.  
This argument is meritless.  The phrase “except as provided 
below” modifies the word it is closest to—“Dispute”—
“mean[ing] the exceptions referred to . . . are exceptions to the 
types of disputes that require arbitration . . . [and] not 
exceptions to the requirement that arbitrations be ‘conducted 
by the [CRST] by an authorized representative.’”7  Parm, 835 
F.3d at 1336 (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading 
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152 (2012) for 
interpretive canons of English usage).  Indeed, later parts of the 
Loan Agreement8 demonstrate that this interpretation is the 
correct reading because those subsequent portions explicitly 
exempt certain types of disputes from the arbitration 
                                                                
7 This interpretive canon is known as the last antecedent 
rule.  See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 
210 & n.13 (3d Cir. 2008).  
8 See, e.g., J.A. 88 (subjecting the enforceability of the 
class action waiver “solely [to] a court of competent 
jurisdiction located within the Cheyenne River[] Sioux Tribal 
Nation, and not [to] the arbitrator”); J.A. 89 (identifying a 
“Small Claims Exception” that allows parties to seek 
adjudication “in a small claims tribunal in the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribal Small Claims Court”). 
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provisions.9  Therefore, the Loan Agreement’s arbitration 
provisions direct arbitration to an illusory CRST forum, and 
the Loan Agreement does not provide an alternate forum.10 
 
C 
 
The CRST arbitral forum’s nonexistence does not 
automatically invalidate the arbitration agreement because, 
according to Defendants, the agreement’s severability clause 
allows invalid provisions, such as the selection of an illusory 
                                                                
9 Because we are examining arbitration procedures and 
not the scope of the arbitration agreement, the preference for 
construing ambiguity in favor of arbitration does not apply.  
See, e.g., Granite Rock v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 
287, 301 (2010) (explaining that the rebuttable presumption of 
arbitrability applies “only where a validly formed and 
enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether 
it covers the dispute at hand”); First Options of Chi., 514 U.S. 
938, 945 (1995) (stating that “doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration”) 
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)); Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62 
(stating that “due regard must be given to the federal policy 
favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the 
arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration”); 
CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 751 F.3d 165, 172 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (“We must resolve ‘any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitable issues . . . in favor of arbitration.’” (quoting 
Moses H., 460 U.S at 24-25)).  
10 Defendants’ evidence that AAA and JAMS have 
conducted arbitrations does not mean that the arbitrations 
complied with the Loan Agreement. 
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forum, to be severed.  Under New Jersey law, courts may not 
sever language from an agreement where doing so would 
“defeat the central purpose of the contract.” Jacob v. Norris, 
McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 154 (N.J. 1992).  To 
determine the agreement’s primary purpose, courts look to “the 
parties’ intent at the time the agreement was executed, as 
determined from the language of the contract and the 
surrounding circumstances.”  Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., 
VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 288 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
Here, the Loan Agreement reflects that the CRST 
arbitration provision was an integral, not ancillary, part of the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate, despite the inclusion of a 
severability clause in the contract.  J.A. 89 (“If any of this 
Arbitration Provision is held invalid, the remainder shall 
remain in effect.”)  The Loan Agreement references CRST or 
its rules in most paragraphs concerning arbitration.  See 
Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1350-51.  For example, the arbitration 
provision states that arbitration “shall be conducted” by the 
CRST, J.A. 86, without referencing any other arbitral forums, 
and more importantly, the Loan Agreement as a whole 
repeatedly reiterates that it is subject to and governed “solely” 
and “exclusive[ly]” by CRST’s jurisdiction and law.11  J.A. 80 
                                                                
11 As discussed previously, the Choice of Arbitrator 
provision permitting administration by AAA or JAMS does not 
offer an alternative forum because (1) that clause allows those 
organizations to only administer the arbitration and does not 
authorize them to decide disputes; (2) those entities are 
permitted to provide administrative support only “to the extent 
that [their] rules and procedures do not contradict” CRST law 
and the Loan Agreement’s terms; and (3) the arbitration 
provision requires that a CRST representative conduct the 
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(“This Loan Agreement is subject solely to the exclusive laws 
and jurisdiction of the [CRST].”).12  These references reflect 
that the primary purpose of the Loan Agreement was to 
arbitrate disputes subject to CRST oversight and its laws.  See 
Parm, 835 F.3d at 1338 (refusing to compel arbitration because 
the CRST forum is unavailable and “pervasive references to 
the tribal forum and its rules provide evidence that the forum 
selection clause was not simply an ancillary concern but an 
integral aspect of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate”); 
Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1350-53 (similarly refusing to compel 
arbitration despite the presence of a severability clause and 
concluding that the forum selection clause was integral, in part 
because the loan agreement “references the Tribe in five of its 
nine paragraphs regarding arbitration”); cf. Dillon v. BMO 
Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(finding that the CRST choice of law provisions are not 
severable because they “were essential to the purpose of the 
arbitration agreement”); Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 
F.3d 666, 675-76 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating that the 
                                                                
arbitration.  Thus, the Choice of Arbitrator provision “does not 
affect the importance of the CRST forum in the agreement.”  
Parm, 835 F.3d at 1338.   
12 E.g., J.A. 85 (“You also expressly agree that this 
Agreement shall be subject to and construed in accordance 
only with the provisions of the laws of the [CRST], and that no 
United States state or federal law applies to this Agreement.”); 
J.A. 88-89 (“This arbitration provision . . . shall be governed 
by the law of the [CRST]. . . . [t]he arbitrator’s award may be 
filed in the [CRST] Court, which has jurisdiction in this matter 
. . . . All parties . . . shall retain the right to seek adjudication in 
a small claims tribunal in the [CRST] Small Claims Court 
. . . .”) (emphasis omitted).   
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unenforceable CRST choice of law provisions cannot be 
severed and refusing to enforce arbitration because “the 
offending provisions go to the core of the arbitration 
agreement”); Jackson, 764 F.3d at 780-81 (holding that FAA § 
5 does not apply to a similar version of the loan agreement at 
issue here because the arbitral process cannot be saved simply 
by substituting an arbitrator).  Given the centrality of CRST’s 
involvement in the arbitration as reflected by terms of the Loan 
Agreement, compelling arbitration before a different arbitrator 
and without CRST oversight would amount to an 
impermissible rewriting of the contract.  See Parm, 835 F.3d at 
1335 (acknowledging the “presumption in favor of 
arbitration,” but cautioning that “courts are not to twist the 
language of the contract to achieve a result which is favored by 
federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.”); 
Garfinkel, 773 A.2d at 670 (recognizing that while arbitration 
agreements should be construed “liberally in favor of 
arbitration . . . [a] court may not rewrite a contract to broaden 
the scope of arbitration”); Matter of Cmty. Med. Ctr., 623 F.2d 
at 866 (“[T]he court will not make a different or better contract 
than the parties themselves have seen fit to enter into.”); Cargill 
Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicarguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 
F.3d 223, 226 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Arbitration awards made by 
arbitrators not appointed under the method provided in the 
parties’ contract must be vacated.”).  We therefore join our 
sister circuits in concluding that the CRST arbitral forum 
clause is integral to the entire arbitration agreement and cannot 
be severed.13  See Parm, 835 F.3d at 1338; Inetianbor, 768 F.3d 
at 1350-53. 
                                                                
13 The cases Defendants rely on to support their 
severance argument are distinguishable.  For example, the 
arbitration provision in Khan v. Dell, Inc., stated that all 
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disputes “shall be resolved exclusively and finally by binding 
arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum 
[NAF],” but NAF was unavailable.  669 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  Our Court observed that it was ambiguous whether 
“exclusively” was intended to modify “binding arbitration” or 
NAF, and ultimately resolved the ambiguity in favor of 
arbitration due to the “liberal federal policy in favor of 
arbitration.”  Id. at 355-56.  Here, however, unlike the contract 
in Khan, the Loan Agreement contains pervasive references to 
CRST’s laws and exclusive jurisdiction, which reflect that the 
Loan Agreement’s purpose was to arbitrate under CRST 
oversight.  Moreover, the Loan Agreement’s forum selection 
clause, viewed in the overall context of the agreement as a 
whole, differs markedly from the ancillary and discrete fee and 
cost, damages, and class action waiver provisions found to be 
severable in Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 625 
(3d Cir. 2009); Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 
83-86 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 
212, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2003); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
262 F.3d 677, 680-81 (8th Cir. 2001); Muhammad v. Cty Bank 
of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 103 (N.J. 2006), 
preempted in part by statute, Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 
225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011); Garrett-Scheier v. Muller Auto. Grp., 
Inc., No. HNT-L-135-10, 2010 WL 1599419, at *4 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. Apr. 16, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, it would be nonsensical for a court to 
appoint an arbitrator where a drafter created an agreement to 
arbitrate in a forum that does not exist.  Defendants should not 
be permitted to tender agreements containing such a façade and 
then expect courts to step in and order the parties to proceed to 
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IV 
 
 Because the Loan Agreement’s forum selection clause 
is an integral, non-severable part of the arbitration agreement 
and because the CRST arbitral forum designated in that clause 
is illusory, the entire arbitration agreement, including the 
delegation clause, is unenforceable.14  See Parm, 835 F.3d at 
1338 (declining to enforce a delegation clause and an 
arbitration agreement because the arbitral forum provided for 
in the arbitration agreement does not exist); Inetianbor, 768 
F.3d at 1353-54 (same).  Thus, the District Court had the 
authority to decide whether the arbitration agreement was 
valid, correctly decided that it was not, and did not err in 
                                                                
arbitration.  See Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1356-57 (Restani, J., 
concurring).  
14 Federal law presumes forum selection clauses to be 
valid, but that presumption is overcome where the resisting 
party shows that enforcement would be “unreasonable under 
the circumstances.”  Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., Ltd., 933 
F.2d 1207, 1219 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1, 10 (1972)).  Enforcement is unreasonable where either 
the forum selected is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that 
[the resisting party] will for all practical purposes be deprived 
of his day in court,” or the clause was procured through “fraud 
or overreaching.” Foster, 933 F.2d at 1219 (quoting M/S 
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-18).  Applying this standard to the 
arbitration agreement at issue here, we conclude without 
hesitation that enforcement would be unreasonable. 
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denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  Therefore, 
we will affirm.15 
                                                                
15 Judge Vanaskie would also affirm on the alternative 
ground that the Loan Agreement impermissibly waives a 
borrower’s federal and state statutory rights, thereby rendering 
the arbitration clause unenforceable.  In this regard, Judge 
Vanaskie endorses the reasoning of the District Court at J.A. 
14-16 and the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Hayes, 811 F.3d at 
673-74, in which Judge Wilkinson observed that “a party may 
not underhandedly convert a choice of law clause into a choice 
of no law clause,” id. at 675.  Judge Vanaskie agrees with the 
District Court’s conclusion that the Loan Agreement 
establishes “sham dispute resolution procedures,” J.A. 16, and 
would affirm the denial of the motion to compel arbitration on 
this ground as well.     
